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In my article “Challenging
Mainstream Meta- physics” in Women,
Gender & Research 1-2/2012, I described
Karen Barad’s agential realism as “a well
thought through and well argued prolific
theoretical foundation for a disruption of
the mainstream metaphysics of separate-
ness” (Hammarström 2012: 88). Other ar-
ticles in the same issue showed the concrete
practical use of Barad’s theorizing for their
research, such as Milwertz and Fengxian’s
on how Barad’s distinction between inter-
action and intra-action provided them with
a conceptual tool that made it possible for
them to theorize and analyse non-govern-
mental organizing in China, and Højgaard,
Juelskjaer and Søndergaard’s, stating that
[a]gential realism gives us a theoretical frame-
work that allows access to a much wider set of
enacting forces to be considered in any analy-
ses of any type of phenomena, including gen-
dered subjectivity and practice (Højgaard,




– Comments on René Rosfort’s 
Criticism of Karen Barad’s 
Agential Realism
BY MATZ HAMMARSTRÖM
D E B AT
In sharp contrast to this, René Rosfort, in
his article “Different Kinds of Matter(s)”,
claims that although Barad may offer an
“impressive (meta)physical theory about
matter,” her “insistence on the inescapable
entanglement of phenomena […] is no
help against the more concrete and serious
problems of […] human being[s]” (Rosfort
2012: 61). He, therefore, advises “contem-
porary feminist theorists […] to employ her
ideas with caution, if we are to avoid loos-
ing sight of disturbingly concrete ethical
problems that are still in need of careful
analysis” (56). According to Rosfort, sub-
jectivity, body, and ethics are “if not neg-
lected then at least unattended to in
Barad’s ambitious project”, but the over-
arching problem in his (mis)reading of
Barad is what he calls her “methodological
conflation of ethics, ontology, and episte-
mology” (56, 59, 61, 64), and he describes
as his “main point” that “in spite of Barad’s
methodological conflation, various ques-
tions about subjectivity, the body, and indi-
viduality still matter to contemporary femi-
nism” (59). 
Confronted with Rosfort’s criticism the
attentive reader of Barad’s works may raise
an eyebrow or two. Does Barad really neg-
lect questions of subjectivity, body, and
ethics? Does she really suggest a conflation
of ontology, epistemology, and ethics? My
answer is decidedly no, and the aim of this
article is to clarify the meaning of the con-
cept of intra-active entanglement that lies
at the very heart of the diffractive metho-
dology of Barad’s agential realism, and to
show that Rosfort’s criticism of Barad’s
methodology being conflated is due to his
failure to understand and/or his unwilling-
ness to accept the implications of the para-
digmatic shift from an interactive to an
intra-active perspective.
INTRA-ACTIVE RELATIONALITY
Of fundamental importance for an under-
standing of Karen Barad’s agential realism
is her concept of intra-action. Intra-action
is a neologism coined by Barad to express
the idea that the relata (the ‘entities’ that
are related) do not precede the relation but
emerge in and through it. The intra-active
perspective necessitates a rethinking of cen-
tral philosophical concepts such as subject,
object, agency, causality and individuality.
It also entails a radicalized understanding
of relationality and entanglement, making
intra-active relationality and intra-active en-
tanglement into something quite different
and more challenging than its interactive
counterparts. 
In spite of the crucial importance of
intra-action for Barad’s agential realism (re-
ferred to on no less than 62 pages in
Barad’s magnum opus Meeting the Universe
Halfway – Quantum Physics and the Entan-
glement of Matter and Meaning), Rosfort
neglects to comment upon the concept in
any way, he just mentions it en passant a
couple of times. A suitable starting point
for an effort to come to grips with the idea
of intra-action is the first passage dealing
with the concept in Meeting the Universe
Halfway:
The notion of intra-action is a key element of
my agential realist framework. The neologism
‘intra-action’ signifies the mutual constitution
of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast to
the usual ‘interaction,’ which assumes that
there are separate individual agencies that
precede their interaction, the notion of intra-
action recognizes that distinct agencies do
not precede, but rather emerge through, their
intra-action. It is important to note that the
‘distinct’ agencies are only distinct in a rela-
tional, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies
are only distinct in relation to their mutual en-
tanglement; they don’t exist as individual ele-
ments (Barad 2007: 33).
Of utmost importance for an understand-
ing of her thinking are the two lines itali-
cized by Barad, both expressing the idea of
“the mutual constitution of entangled agen-
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cies”, that is, that the constituents of the re-
lation do not pre-exist as individual ele-
ments; they are distinct, but in a qualified
meaning, only in a relational and not in an
absolute sense. Or, more to the point, ex-
pressing both the relational and the active,
agential aspect: they are made to emerge as
distinct in the context of a specific phe-
nomenon, through an ‘agential cut’, a term
Barad uses as a contrast to what she calls
the ‘Cartesian cut’ (333). The latter signi-
fies the idea that there is an inherent pre-
existing cut separating subject and object,
and other elements understood as existing
in themselves. The relational distinction
Barad calls “agential separability” (176) as
opposed to the rejected idea of ontological
separateness, and the idea of ontological
separateness versus agential separability is a
key factor for understanding Barad’s agen-
tial realism, on a par with and intimately re-
lated to the idea of interaction versus intra-
action. 
Agential realism provides an alternative
to the mainstream metaphysics of separate-
ness, an intra-active relationalist meta-
physics according to which the ontological
primary is not pre-existing ontologically
separate things or objects but agentially
produced phenomena. A phenomenon is an
entanglement of intra-acting ‘agencies’,
marking the ontological non-separateness
of observer and observed. Contrary to the
pervasive individualism and atomism of
mainstream metaphysics with its standard
matter-of-fact view of relata as prior to rela-
tions, the agential realist perspective is that
“phenomena are ontologically primitive re-
lations – relations without pre-existing rela-
ta” (139). An important consequence of
this is that distinction presupposes relation
(not vice versa as in the interactive perspec-
tive). It is this distinction-in-intra-active-re-
lation that Barad expresses by her concept
of the agential cut as a “cutting together-
apart” (Barad 2012a: 16). Thus, Barad
does not rule out difference and differen-
tiation, but in her intra-active perspective
“differentiating is not about othering or
separating but on the contrary about mak-
ing connections and commitments” (Barad
2007: 392). This “relational nature of dif-
ference” (72) is a crucial aspect of Barad’s
diffractive methodology.
THE DIFFRACTIVE METHOD
In Meeting the Universe Halfway, Barad
writes that “[t]he phenomenon of diffrac-
tion is an apt overarching trope for [the]
book” (70), and that she sees diffraction as
her method. The physical phenomenon of
diffraction is described by Barad as having
“to do with the way waves combine when
they overlap and the apparent bending and
spreading of waves that occurs when waves
encounter an obstruction” (74). Of para-
mount importance for the development of
quantum physics is that matter, given a cer-
tain experimental set–up, shows a diffrac-
tion pattern. This indicates that matter
might not be as particular as it is generally
supposed to be. The relevant point here for
an understanding of Barad’s thinking, is
that different experimental set-ups (differ-
ent apparatuses) produce different pheno-
mena, and that, consequently, the apparatus
is to be seen as part of the phenomenon.
Diffraction points to what Barad describes
as “the entangled structure of the changing
and contingent ontology of the world”
(73), and this, she says, makes diffraction
useful as a “heuristic to mark the kinds of
shifts that are at issue in moving away from
[…] representationalism (reflecting on the
world from outside) to a way of under-
standing the world from within and as part
of it” (88).
In contrast to reflection, which Barad
characterizes as concerned with separate
entities, diffraction as “an ethico-onto-epis-
temological matter” is concerned with spe-
cific entanglements and “challenges the
presumed inherent separability [i.e., the
ontological separateness] of subject and ob-
ject, nature and culture, fact and value, hu-
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man and nonhuman, organic and inorgan-
ic, epistemology and ontology, materiality
and discursivity” (381). Important to no-
tice, however, is that this rejection of onto-
logical separateness does not mean that the
binaries nature and culture, epistemology
and ontology etc., are conflated or col-
lapsed. Nature and culture, epistemology
and ontology are still different, but inter-
twined and mutually co-constitutive, that
is, intra-actively entangled. Barad writes:
Diffraction marks the limits of the determina-
cy and permanency of boundaries […] Dif-
fraction is a matter of differential entangle-
ments. Diffraction is not merely about differ-
ences, and certainly not differences in any ab-
solute sense, but about the entangled nature of
differences that matter” (ibid). And of crucial
importance is the above-mentioned agential
cut that “cut things together and apart (ibid).
ENTANGLEMENT IS NOT CONFLATION
Rosfort is critical of Barad’s “ethico-onto-
epistem-ology, in which ethics, ontology,
and epistemology are no longer separate
fields of study” (Rosfort 2012: 58). It is
correct that Barad wants us to see the three
as entangled, that the diffractive paradigm
“challenges the presumed inherent separa-
bility” (Barad 2007: 381). But through
neglecting the crucial word ‘inherent’ Ros-
fort fails to recognize the difference be-
tween agential separability and inherent
(ontological) separateness. This makes him
miss what Barad stresses as crucial, that
“diffraction attends to the relational nature
of difference; it does not figure difference as
either a matter of essence or as inconse-
quential” (72). Rosfort’s position seems to
be that either difference is a matter of
essence, or there is no difference at all.
Since Barad rejects an essentialist under-
standing of difference, he interprets her as
conflating the entangled ‘entities’, which to
Barad are agentially separable.
Rosfort’s article rests largely on this mis-
apprehension that ‘entanglement’ is syno-
nymous with ‘conflation’. He writes repeat-
edly about Barad’s alleged “attempts to
conflate ethics, ontology, and epistemolo-
gy” (Rosfort 2012: 56, 59, 61, 64). But
while conflation means that two or more
entities are fused into and reduced to one,
entanglement does not carry this reductive
meaning. Entanglement expresses the idea
that two or more entities are intimately re-
lated, so that one of the entities cannot be
fully understood or described without con-
sidering the other(s). Regardless of how
many times Rosfort repeats his accusation;
Barad’s insistence on the entanglement of
ontology, epistemology, and ethics does not
mean that she conflates the three. And fur-
thermore: Barad’s intra-active perspective
radicalizes the idea of entanglement, since
the intimately related entities are entities
only in and through the entanglement. 
I read Rosfort’s criticism of Barad for
not paying attention to subjectivity, body,
and ethics, and for conflating ontology, epis-
temology, and ethics, as a consequence of
his failure to understand and/or appreciate
the idea of intra-action. From Rosfort’s in-
teractive perspective the rejection of the
idea of pre-existing separate individuals pre-
ceding the relation apparently looks like a
wholesale rejection of individuals, which
makes him believe that he has to safeguard
the individual from Barad’s methodology.
Consequently he writes that he insists “on
the individual, because [he] believes that the
concrete problems of the individual person
should always be at the centre of […] gen-
der studies” (64). But the individual as
concrete human person is not lost in
Barad’s perspective, only differently (dif-
fractively) understood – as Barad expresses
it herself:
the notion of an individual needs to be taken
seriously […] At the same time, it’s crucial to
raise the question of how ‘the individual’, in-
cluding any particular individual, is iteratively
(re)constituted (Barad 2012a: 11).
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Far from neglecting subjectivity, body, and
ethics, Barad reconceptualizes these con-
cepts in a way that, to my mind, enhances
our understanding of and possibilities to
deal with a whole range of important ques-
tions, not least for contemporary feminism. 
The idea of entanglement does not
mean that what are entangled cannot be
differentiated, discussed, or remedied, only
that the different entangled strands cannot
be adequately dealt with in isolation, as if
they were unrelated to the others. As ex-
plained above, an intra-active understand-
ing of entanglement also entails that the
entangled strands are not understood as
self-subsistent entities, but as continuously
and co-constitutionally refigured in and
through their mutual interdependence.
It is very difficult to understand how and
why the consequence of Barad’s insistence
on the entanglement of ontology, episte-
mology and ethics should be that we “ig-
nore these dimensions” (Rosfort 2012:
63), or let them subside “into the entang-
led background of Barad’s account.” I find
no arguments in Rosfort’s text to support
this, only a constant repetition of the accu-
sation. If anywhere, entanglement is in the
foreground in Barad’s account.
Rosfort writes that “[e]very problem is
always an entangled product of epistemolo-
gy, ontology, and ethics” and that “entang-
led human problems” are “all too often in-
vestigated and handled in reductive […]
ways” (60), but still he finds Barad’s insis-
tence on this very entanglement “reduc-
tive” (ibid.). This may seem paradoxical,
but my way of understanding it is that Ros-
fort accepts the need of a multidisciplinary
approach to human problems, but that his
perspective is interactive in contrast to
Barad’s intra-active approach. Acknowledg-
ing intra-active entanglement is not a ques-
tion of relating what is unrelated and sepa-
rate to begin with, but to realize that the
relational entanglement is the primary. On-
tology, epistemology and ethics are not
three distinct and separate disciplines that
are to be kept apart, neither is it enough to
relate the three to each other. Barad’s point
is that ontology, epistemology and ethics
are always already related and so intimately
intertwined that a neat demarcation be-
tween the three is impossible. However,
that they are intra-actively entangled does
not mean that they are one and the same or
that distinctions between them cannot be
made. What it means is that they are, and
are what they are in and through the ongo-
ing intra-active relation that iteratively re-
configures them, and that the one cannot
be understood without considering the
others. Neither is it a correct description of
Barad’s position when Rosfort writes that
she does not make a distinction between
mind and body, or between subject and ob-
ject. On the contrary, Barad’s point is that
we must actively (and iteratively) make this
distinction since it is not given, that is,
mind and body, subject and object (like on-
tology, epistemology, and ethics) are agen-
tially separable, but not ontologically sepa-
rate.
THE INTRA-ACTIVE ENTANGLEMENT OF
MIND AND BODY
To support his idea of the importance of
seeing ontology, epistemology, and ethics
as “distinct explanatory layers” (69), and to
bring home his main point “that – in spite
of Barad’s methodological conflation –
various questions about subjectivity, the
body, and individuality still matter to con-
temporary feminism” (59), Rosfort uses
the correspondence between Princess Elisa-
beth of Bohemia and Renée Descartes on
the question of the relation between mind
and body. 
According to Descartes the world con-
sists of two separate and distinct kinds of
substances or things: minds and bodies.
Minds are thinking things, bodies are ex-
tended things, and we humans are a combi-
nation of these two separate and distinct
substances. Elisabeth starts her correspon-
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dence with Descartes in 1643 upon reading
his Meditations, mainly because she is puzz-
led by the question of how mind and body,
understood by Descartes as two fundamen-
tally different and separate substances, can
interact.
To support the Christian doctrine of the
immortal soul Descartes needs the idea of
separateness, but at the same time he is un-
easy with this idea. In the final part of his
Meditations he writes that sensations like
hunger and pain teach him that he is not
present in his body “as a sailor is present in
his ship”, but that he is “very closely con-
joined to it, and as it were, mingled
throughout it” (Curley 1988: 56). When
Elisabeth continues to press him and writes
that she finds it easier “to attribute matter
and extension to the soul than to attribute
to it the capacity to move a body, and to be
moved by it, without having matter” (58f),
Descartes answers that “she should feel free
to attribute matter and extension to the
soul, ‘for that is nothing but conceiving it
as being united to the body’” (Letter 28
juni 1643 (quote from Curley 1988: 59)).
This answer from Descartes, hinting at the
entanglement of mind and body, Rosfort
neglects to share with his readers, possibly
because he shows a strong tendency himself
to dissociate mind from body (here Rosfort
seems more Cartesian than Descartes), and
thinks and speaks of the body as “mine,” as
a kind of vessel for the mind, “a pre-reflec-
tive organ through which I interact with
the world” (Rosfort 2012: 61).
The correspondence between Elisabeth
and Descartes is resumed in the spring of
1645 when Elisabeth suffered from what
Rosfort denotes as a “physical malaise”, al-
though it is “perceptibly” diagnosed by
Des-cartes as “sadness” (59). This insight
into the (entangled) relatedness of mind
and body, that the malaise might as well be
classified as psychic, Rosfort surprisingly
takes as showing us “why ethics, ontology,
and epistemology are not as easily conflated
as is the case in Barad’s ‘ethico-onto-epis-
tem-ology’” (ibid.). Here the two different
ways to understand relationality and en-
tanglement are displayed again: Rosfort’s
(and Descartes’) interactive understanding,
where the relation is seen as preceded by
relata, understood as separate pre-existing
individuals; Barad’s (and possibly Elisa-
beth’s) intra-active understanding, where
the relation is not preceded by pre-existing
relata, but is, as French philosopher Gilbert
Simondon has put it “simultaneous to the
terms for which it ensures the existence”
(Simondon 2009: 10, my italics). 
Rosfort insists that “[e]xplanations of
the mind and the brain are still two differ-
ent enterprises.” I agree that they are but
we are led into an impasse with Rosfort’s
questions
What is the accurate description of sadness?
Is it the careful description of complex neuro-
modulators […] or the just as careful de-
scription of the experiential features of sad-
ness? (60).
This kind of questioning is as misplaced as
asking for the “accurate description” of
light. Neither light nor sadness is some-
thing determinate in itself.1 Different appa-
ratuses, that is, the complex material-dis-
cursive ways through which we intra-act
with and as part of the world (in a very




tial-features. Sadness-as-brain-fact and sad-
ness-as-introspectively-experienced, are two
different phenomena, and the one is not
causing the other.
In an article referred to by Rosfort, Lena
Shapiro deals with the correspondence be-
tween Elisabeth and Descartes, and argues
that Elisabeth in her letters
defends neither a reductionist materialism nor
a substance dualism, but rather wants to find
a way of respecting the autonomy of thought
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without denying that this faculty of reason is
in some essential way dependent on our bodi-
ly condition (Shapiro 1999: 506).
Elisabeth’s view, according to Shapiro, is
that Descartes’ “principle of independent
subsistence is belied by the phenomena”
(507), and that mind and body are to be
viewed as distinct but mutually dependent.
This idea of distinction in mutual depen-
dence comes close to Barad’s idea of intra-
active entanglement, according to which
mind and body, neither of them being a
self-subsisting entity, are to be seen as only
relationally distinct.
Shapiro describes Elisabeth’s view as “an
alternative metaphysics which is neither a
substance dualism nor a reductionist mate-
rialism” (516). I would say that this is quite
a good description of Barad’s view as well.
The question is why Rosfort salutes Elisa-
beth’s insight and discredits Barad’s. 
CONCLUSION
In spite of his professed acknowledgement
of entanglement, Rosfort’s perspective re-
mains one of separateness. He sees the epis-
temological, ontological, and ethical as-
pects of sadness as separate matters linked
to “distinct explanatory layers” (Rosfort
2012: 60). According to Rosfort “any at-
tempt to conflate the various methodolo-
gies […] risks loosing sight of what is really
at stake – namely, to understand and cope
with sadness” (ibid.). I would say that to
Barad, what is necessary to be able to un-
derstand and cope with sadness (or any-
thing else) is precisely to understand the in-
tra-active entanglement of mind and body,
and of ontology, epistemology, and ethics.
Rosfort seems to be aware of this entangle-
ment when he writes that “[e]very problem
is always an entangled product of episte-
mology, ontology, and ethics,” and that
“entangled human problems […] are all
too often investigated and handled in re-
ductive […] ways” (ibid.). The best expla-
nation I can divine for his finding Barad’s
insistence on this very entanglement reduc-
tive and conflating, is that he interprets
Barad’s intra-active perspective from within
his own interactive perspective, which leads
him to interpret the contingent iteratively
reconfigured individuals of Barad’s agential
realism as non-existent.
I would be very surprised if Barad did
not share Rosfort’s opinion that “various
questions about subjectivity, the body, and
individuality still matter to contemporary
feminism”, and far from leaving these as-
pects ‘unattended’, Barad refers to them on
numerous pages in Meeting the Universe
Halfway. Where she differs from Rosfort is
in her opinion that the best way to under-
stand, formulate and deal with these ques-
tions is to acknowledge the intra-active en-
tanglement of ethics, ontology, and episte-
mology. This does not amount to a confla-
tion of the three, but expresses the insight
that questions of being, knowing, and do-
ing are intimately related, that is, that it is
impossible to do ontology, without at the
same time do epistemology and ethics. As
Barad stresses, different ways of under-
standing, describing and explaining the
world (sadness included) “materializes a
different configuration of the world, not
merely a different description of a fixed and
independent reality,” and “[w]e are respon-
sible for the world of which we are a part,
not because it is an arbitrary construction
of our choosing but because reality is sedi-
mented out of particular practices that we
have a role in shaping and through which
we are shaped” (Barad 2012: 390).
NOTE
1. In her most recent publication, the short What
is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, 
Justice, Barad expresses this idea succinctly: “Mea-
surements are agential practices, which are not
simply revelatory but performative: they help to
constitute and are a constitutive part of what is be-
ing measured” (Barad 2012b:6).
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